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Reforming International Extradition:
Lessons of the Past for a Radical New
Approach
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI*
The practice of international extradition is neither the
product of sound legislative policy nor the outgrowth of judicious
doctrinal thinking. Instead, it is the outcome of circumstances that
brought certain legal issues before U.S. courts, which in turn
generated legislative responses that are no longer in keeping with
contemporary needs.
The early problems of extradition in the United States, which
began in 1793, have survived the ages (with some mutation)
despite persistent challenges to common sense and defiance of
sound legal thinking. To understand some of the contemporary
problems of extradition, it is useful to retrace their origins back to
1799.
International extradition presented itself to the American
judicial and political arenas between 1799 and 1853 through three
major cases that confronted federal district courts and the
Supreme Court of the United States, several presidents, and the
* Professor of Law; President, International Human Rights Law Institute, DePaul
University; President, International Institute of Higher Studies in Criminal Sciences;
President, International Association of Penal Law.
1. For an insightful scholarly review of these cases and the legal issues they present,
see John Parry, The Lost History of International Extradition Litigation, 43 VA. J. INT'L L.
93 (2002) and Ruth Wedgewood, The Revolutionary Martyrdom of Jonathan Robbins, 100
YALE L.J. 229 (1990). For a history of U.S. extradition law and practice, see JOHN
BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTER-STATE RENDITION (2 vols.
1891) and SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-
STATE (3d ed. 1885). For a contemporary perspective on extradition history, see Ethan A.
Nadelmann, The Evolution of United States Involvement in the International Rendition of
Fugitive Criminals, 25 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 813 (1993).
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U.S. Congress: In re Robins, In re Metzger' and In re Kaine.' The
first of these cases, certainly the most controversial of the three,
involved the administration of President John Adams and
Congressman John Marshall, who later became Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court.
For the young nation that was the United States of America,
having had only recently to fight for its independence, testing the
limits of the executive branch's powers in foreign affairs presented
major constitutional and political questions.5 At the heart of that
debate, with respect to extradition, was the constitutional doctrine
of separation of powers, which still surfaces in many contemporary
cases, particularly those involving the political offense exception6
and the rule of non-inquiry.7
For a young nation jealous of its rule of law and the
independence of its judiciary, the question of whether the federal
executive branch could decide on surrendering to a foreign power
a person within the United States, particularly a U.S. citizen,
without a judicial determination was highly questionable.
Underlying that constitutional debate were the politics of
federalism, and the ever-suspicious public concern with the
expansion of federal executive powers.8
2. 27 F. Cas. 825 (D.S.C. 1799) (No. 16,175).
3. 17 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511), 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847). France
requested the extradition of Metzger, a decision that Judge Betts made in chambers,
without a public hearing. This provoked a public debate over such a procedure that
violated the sense of fairness in the due process of law.
4. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852).
5. See, e.g., BLAND RANDALL WALTON, THE BLACK ROBE AND THE BALD
EAGLE: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1953 (1996).
6. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION IN U.S. LAW AND
PRACTICE, 594 (4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION].
7. Id. at 569.
8. See, e.g., ISAAC KRAMNICK, JAMES MADISON, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND
JOHN JAY: THE FEDERALIST PAPERS (1987); THE FEDERALISTS (Benjamin Fletcher ed.,
1961); THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION, FEDERALIST AND ANTI-FEDERALIST,
SPEECHES, ARTICLES AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER RATIFICATION
(1993); see also T.M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1889); ANDREW MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
(1935). It should be noted that President Adams was a federalist. See DAVID
MCCULLOUGH, JOHN ADAMS (2001); JOHN R. HOWE JR., THE CHANGING POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF JOHN ADAMS (1966). He was succeeded by President Thomas Jefferson,
who was not a federalist. See THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON (Andrew A.
Lipscomb ed., 1903); see also DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN CONGRESS: THE
FEDERALIST PERIOD: 1789-1801 (1907).
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The context, always very important in such matters, was laden
with the emotionally charged undercurrent of America's suspicion
of foreign governments. The facts of the first case in question, the
Robbins case, were particularly gripping.9 The fate of a U.S.
citizen was at stake, one who was seeking the protection of his
country from America's former colonial ruler, England. This was,
after all, a country established in the name of freedom, to which
people from all over the world, particularly the oppressed, were
welcomed. To turn them back to their oppressors was something
that rubbed raw American public sensitivities. The merger of all
of these issues and the legislative and jurisprudential void on the
subject of extradition made them more complex.
The request for Robbins was based on Jay's Treaty of 1794,"
which provided for extradition with England. It was the second
treaty involving extradition, the first being the 1788 Consular
Convention with France" (1788 U.S.-France Treaty), providing for
the same. Both treaties received the Senate's "advice and
consent," but national implementing legislation was only enacted
with respect to the 1788 U.S.-France Treaty.12 It gave the task of
determining extradition, as of 1792 when the national
implementing legislation was passed, to "District Judges of the
United States."' 3 Thus, the judiciary was empowered to determine
whether to issue a warrant of surrender based on what was most
natural for U.S. courts to rely upon, namely the standard of
"probable cause" which was contained in the Fourth Amendment
to the U.S. Constitution, adopted in 1791.
This was also a time when one of the most important U.S.
legislative acts had been adopted, the Judiciary Act of 1789.14 It
9. 27 F. Cas. 825.
10. Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, Nov. 19, 1794, U.S.-U.K., 8 Stat. 116,
T.S. No. 105 [hereinafter Jay Treaty].
11. Convention with the Purpose of Defining and Establishing the Functions and
Privileges of Respective Consuls and Vice-Consuls, Nov. 14, 1788, U.S.-Fr., 8 Stat. 106,
T.S.84 [hereinafter 1788 U.S.-France Treaty]. For a contemporary perspective, see
Christopher L. Blakesley, Extradition Between France and the United States: An Exercise
in Comparative and International Law, 13 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 653 (1980).
12. An Act Concerning Consuls and Vice-Consuls, § 1, 1 Stat. 254 (1792) [hereinafter
U.S.-France Treaty].
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., ORIGINS OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY: ESSAYS ON THE JUDICIARY
ACT OF 1789 (Maeva Marcus ed., 1992); see also Paul M. Bater, The Constitution as
Architecture: Legislative and Administrative Courts under Article Ill, 65 IND. L.J. 233
(1990). The debate over the Constitutional status of extradition hearings, and whether it is
2003]
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vested the Article III powers of the U.S. Constitution in the
"Justices of the Supreme" as well as "Justices of the District
Court," who had the power to grant Writs of Habeas Corpus for
the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of any commitment or
deprivation of liberty. Extradition was a commitment resulting in
deprivation of liberty, and thus should have naturally fallen within
the meaning of Article III cases. That was not so clear then,
however, nor is it now.15
At that time, as now, parallel legal tracks dealt with the same
subject and were unconnected, even though each implicated the
Constitution, treaties, national legislation, and judicial
interpretation of all of the above. Constitutional questions arose
concerning the separation of powers, the power of the federal
executive branch in matters of foreign affairs, the consequences of
the treaty-making powers of the executive, the overlapping
congressional power to pass national legislation to implement
treaties, federal legislation on the jurisdiction and powers of the
Federal judiciary in light of Article III, and the limits of judicial
prerogatives in hearing and interpreting of these questions.
All of these sources of law had some connection to
international extradition, but none was explicitly applicable to that
subject, and at best dealt with extradition only peripherally or
partially. The exceptions, of course, are specific treaties,
legislation, and judicial decisions. Any judicial decisions
pertaining to a treaty, however, were limited to the provisions of
that particular treaty, and thus not extendable to other treaties and
within or outside Article III courts is persistent. See Kulekowski v. DiLenardi, 947 F.
Supp. 741 (N.D. Ill. 1996), rev'd sub nom. DeSilva v. DiLenardi, 125 F.3d 1110 (7" Cir.
1997); LoBue v. Christopher, 893 F. Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated on juris. grounds, 82
F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996). In contrast, see Carreno v. Johnson, 899 F. Supp. 624 (S.D.
Fla. 1995), In re Suttan, 905 F. Supp. 631 (E.D. Mo. 1995), and Werner v. Hickey, 920 F.
Supp. 1257 (M.D. Fla. 1996). These cases go so far as to deny the executive branch the
"executive discretion," a proposition fully accepted by various Circuit Court and District
Court opinions. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 890-97.
15. To date, review of extradition hearing orders are by means of habeas corpus. See
BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 857. See in particular Matter of Mackin 668
F.2d 122 (2d. Cir. 1981) where the government argued for a right of appeal and Judge
Friendly went back to In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511); 46 U.S. (5
How.) 176 (1847), and In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852). Id. at 125-30. For a
review of early habeas corpus cases and doctrine, see WILLIAM S. CHURCH, A TREATISE
ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS (1886). For relevant decisions during that period, see
Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103, Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (3 Wall.) 2 (1867), and Ex parte
Clarke, 100 U.S. 399 (1879).
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cases interpreting them. These legal sources and the legal issues
arising from extradition practice have overlapped to create a
confusing and uncertain body of law. For example, the 1788 U.S.-
France Treaty 6 dealing with the surrender of fugitives specifically
provided for a hearing, but a certain ambivalence or uncertainty
was evident in the choice of words so that such a hearing be before
"the courts, judges and officers competent" of the requested state.
The Statute implementing that treaty specified that the hearing
would be before "the District Judges of the United States."'' 7 One
can only speculate that those who represented the United States in
negotiating the Convention with France were uncertain as to the
proper extraditing authority, since it referred to "judges and
competent officers." The former are part of the judiciary and the
latter are members of the executive branch. Assuming that those
representing the executive branch at these negotiations were
unsure as to whether the power to surrender was an executive or
judicial one, Congress had no doubt that such power vested in the
judiciary as evidenced by the national implementing legislation of
the 1788 U.S.-France Treaty.' 8 The executive branch's uncertainty
however was reflected in the Attorney General's petition for a
Writ of Mandamus to compel New York Federal District Judge
John Lawrence to issue a warrant for the surrender of a French
captain, who was sought by France pursuant to the 1788 U.S.-
France Treaty, and had abandoned his ship in New York. The
Supreme Court in United States vs. Lawrence9 confirmed the
judicial nature of the hearing and denied the petition for a writ of
mandamus on the grounds that this was not a remedy available to
the Executive for a case within the jurisdiction of a federal district
court judge.20
16. 1788 U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 11.
17. U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 12.
18. Id. Other examples of the confusion as to the proper authority to extradite are
the U.S.-Mexico treaties of 1861 and 1899, which delegated that authority to border states
without the involvement of the federal government or the federal judiciary. Treaty for the
Extradition of Criminals, Dec. 11, 1861, U.S.-Mex., 12 Stat. 1199; Treaty of Extradition,
Feb. 22, 1899, U.S.-Mex., 31 Stat. 1818; see Alona Evans, Legal Bases of Extradition in the
United States, 16 N.Y.L.F. 525, 535-36 (1970).
19. United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42 (1795) (per curiam). For a
narrative of the case, see CHRISTOPHER H. PYLE, EXTRADITION, POLITICS, AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 19-21 (2001).
20. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dal].) 42.
2003]
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev.
The 1794 Treaty with England 21 also required a hearing and
also reflected the Executive's uncertainty as to whether that
hearing was to be a judicial adjudication. But Congress did not, as
it did with respect to the 1788 U.S.-France Treaty,22 provide
national implementing legislation for the 1794 Treaty with
England. 2 However, Article 27 of the 1794 Treaty required the
parties to:
[D]eliver up to justice all persons who, being charged with
murder or forgery, committed within the jurisdiction of either,
shall seek an asylum within any of the country's of the other,
provided that this shall only be done on such evidence of
criminality, and, according to the laws of the place, where the
fugitive or person so charged shall be found, would justify his
apprehension and commitment for trial, if the offence had there
been committed.24
While it is clear that this provision analogized the hearing to
that of a "commitment for trial" as contemplated by the 1788 U.S.-
France Treaty25 and the implementing legislation,26 it was still
deemed an open issue. Instead, it should have been treated by
analogy to any other "commitment for trial" under U.S. law.
Consequently, there should have been no doubt that the hearing
was to be a "probable cause" judicial hearing, even though the
Fourth Amendment, which refers to this standard was only
adopted in 1791 along with the ten first amendments.
Curiously enough, the debate still exists in contemporary
practice as to whether the judicial hearing required by 18 U.S.C. §
318427 and which refers to "probable cause" is a reflection of the
Fourth Amendment or whether it is purely a statutory
requirement, which can therefore be statutorily abrogated.&
The ambiguity, which could have been easily resolved on the
basis of reasoned logic and analogy, soon became the basis of a
national controversy in which politics and the then vibrant
21. Jay Treaty, supra note 10.
22. U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 12.
23. Jay Treaty, supra note 10.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. U.S.-France Treaty, supra note 12.
27. The judicial hearing controversy was resolved with the adoption of the 1848 Act,
Ch. 167 §5, 9 Stat. 302.
28. But see Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn on other
grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 877 (1998).
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American sense of fairness aroused public passion. 29 The case
involved one Thomas Nash, alias Jonathan Robbins, who was
arrested in 1799 in Charleston, South Carolina for the charge of
murder, allegedly committed during the course of a mutiny on the
Hermione, a British ship, which was moored in Charleston's port."'
The British were eager to have Nash, alias Robbins, surrendered
with the ostensible purpose of trying him for mutiny and murder,
and hanging him for such offenses, even though he was a U.S.
citizen who was "shanghaied," that is, seized by force and kept
against his will to serve on the ship.31 They addressed their request
to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, while at the same time
the matter was brought before District Court Judge Thomas Bee
to order the surrender of the requested person. Secretary of State
Pickering advised President John Adams that Judge Bee should be
directed to deliver the offender in question, since the United
States had obligated itself under Jay's Treaty to do so. Having
apparently convinced President Adams, Secretary Pickering
informed Judge Bee of the President's request that Nash be
delivered to a representative of England. However, Secretary
Pickering was careful to indicate that Judge Bee should do so on
the basis of evidence of criminality to be produced by England that
would justify, as the treaty requires, his "commitment for trial."33
At the outset, it appeared uncertain as to whether the President,
acting through the Secretary of State, was seeking to influence
Judge Bee; or, whether he merely wished to emphasize that it was
the judiciary's prerogative to hear and consider the evidence and
to determine whether it was sufficient to constitute, presumably,
"probable cause" in order to justify "commitment for trial," after
which the judge was to issue an order for the surrender of the
requested person. In fact, one can feel this same impatience on
the part of the government in many contemporary cases where the
government argues that the treaty obligation of the United States
29. See John Parry's detailed and incisive description of the facts and context of this
case, supra note 1, as well as In re Metzger, 17 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511); 46
U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847) and In re Kaine, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852). See also
Wedgewood, supra note 1; PYLE, supra note 19, at 24.
30. See sources cited supra note 29.
31. The facts are described in Judge Bee's opinion, supra note 2; Parry, supra note 1;
Wedgewood, supra note 1; and PYLE, supra note 19.
32. WALTON, supra note 5; see also Parry supra note 1, at 109-113 & nn. 78-80 & 104
(explaining the positions of Adams and Pickering through reference to original sources).
33. Jay Treaty, supra note 10.
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34would be impaired if extradition would not be granted. A more
benign interpretation of that directive could be that the judge
should order the surrender of the requested person to the
requesting state without having to wait for any further action by
the executive branch, but that does not seem borne out by the
circumstances and context of the case.35 There could have been a
reasonable and logical interpretation of the President's direction
as a delineation of the overlapping powers of the Judicial and
36executive branches. However, at that time there was no
legislation concerning extradition and, as stated above, no statute
implementing the 1794 Treaty.
Judge Bee treated the case as a federal question case under
Article III and made the analogy between international
extradition and inter-state rendition of a fugitive fleeing from one
state to another. He also interpreted the judicial power as
extending to treaty interpretation. Consequently, Judge Bee's
jurisdictional ruling was intuitively correct, but it was not based on
statutory authority. Since he viewed the action by Secretary
Pickering as executive interference with a judicial function, a
constitutional controversy erupted. Nevertheless, Judge Bee ruled
that Robbins was to be surrendered to the British Consul.37
Robbins was then promptly convicted and executed by British
authorities, fueling the controversy in light of his U.S. citizenship.
John Marshall took the position in Congress that the Judicial
Branch does not have the power to deal with treaties and that
Article III does not cover matters that are within the jurisdiction
of a foreign state's judicial prerogative." He thus concluded that
34. In my personal experience with over 100 extradition cases, rarely was it not said
by the Assistant U.S. Attorney, during or at the end of the proceedings, that the treaty
obligations of the United States were at stake, and that somehow the judiciary should be
conscious of this-the implication being that because of overlapping powers, the judiciary
should be mindful of the Executive's power.
35. For the context of the case, see Parry, supra note 1, at 108-24. In today's practice,
it is not the judiciary that surrenders an individual to a requested foreign government, but
the Executive. See 18 U.S.C. § 3196 (2003).
36. The debate over the foreign affairs powers of the Executive has remained
constant from these early days on. See, e.g., Louis HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE
CONSTITUTION (2d ed. 1996).
37. Robbins, 27 F. Cas. at 833.
38. See Statement of Representative John Marshall, 10 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 660th
CONG., FIRST SESSION 1' 607 (Mar. 7, 1800). This and other relevant facts and analysis
are described in Wedgewood, supra note 1, at 229; and PYLE, supra note 19, at 24-47.
More particularly, see Parry, supra note 1, at 105-20. It should be noted that Chief Justice
396 [Vol. 25:389
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the case was for the Executive to decide and not subject to judicial
decision by a federal district court judge. In a sense, Congressman
Marshall raised the issue that subsequently became known as the
"political question doctrine." There is much debate as to what
Marshall really advocated, though he supported, in part, Adams'
position limiting the role of the judiciary. Marshall, however, did
concede that a person sought for extradition had the right to
question the legality of his arrest by means of a Petition for a Writ
of Habeas Corpus.3 9 The pendulum then swung in favor of a
greater role for the Executive in matters of extradition, 40 as the
constitutional interpretation of the doctrine of separation of
powers favored the executive branch in the absence of statutory
authority to the contrary.1
Between 1794, when Jay's Treaty was entered into and the
controversial Robbins case subsequently decided, and 1848 when
the first extradition legislation was enacted, 42 extradition in the
United States was carried out without the benefit of national
legislation.43
Marshall in his seminal opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), held
that a writ of mandamus was an appropriate remedy under Section 13 of the 1789
Judiciary Act. But in the Lawrence case, it was not judged to be an appropriate remedy.
See Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42.
39. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 615 (1800). Chief Justice Marshall's majority opinion in
United States v. Rauscher, 119 U.S. 407 (1886), was most enlightened, solidly upholding the
judiciary's role in international extradition. But this opinion came after Congress had
enacted the 1848 Act. Ch. 167 §5, 9 Stat. 302; see also sources cited infra note 43
(providing the legislative history of extradition).
40. See H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President's Authority over Foreign
Affairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1511-28 (1999).
41. The issue of separation of powers was raised in LoBue v. Christopher, 893 F.
Supp. 65 (D.D.C. 1995), vacated on juris. grounds, 82 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 1996). That
proposition was revisited by the Second Circuit in Lo Duca v. United States, 93 F.3d 1100
(2d Cir. 1996). The position was also followed by other circuits in cases that raised the
issue of the overlapping roles of executive and judicial powers. See Lopez-Smith v. Hood,
121 F.3d 1322, 1326 (9th Cir. 1997); Martin v. Warden, 993 F.2d 824, 828 (11th Cir. 1993);
Eain v.Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504, 513 (7th Cir. 1981); see also cases cited supra note 14.
42. Act of Aug. 12, 1848, ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303.
43. As stated above, the first legislative act concerning extradition was the Act of
Aug. 12, 1848. See Ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302 (1848). The Act provided that extradition of
relators from the United States could be performed only pursuant to a treaty, and set forth
the procedure to be followed by judges or commissioners. During those years, the
following legislation was passed: Act of Aug. 12, 1848, Ch. 167, § 5, 9 Stat. 302, 303; Act of
June 22, 1860, Ch. 184, 12 Stat. 84 (requiring authentication of documents); Act of Mar. 3,
1869, Ch. 141, §§ 1-3, 15 Stat. 337-38 (establishing procedure for delivery of relator from
United States to requesting state); Act of June 19, 1876, Ch. 133, 19 Stat. 59 (providing
that authenticated foreign documents are admissible into evidence); Act of Aug. 3, 1882,
398 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Rev. [Vol. 25:389
In 1847, the Supreme Court revisited the issue of extradition
in In re Metzger" and thereafter in In re Kaine.45  The latter,
however, was decided after the 1848 Act 46 Yet both of these caseswere ubseuenty""47
were subsequently misinterpreted. In more recent times, the
same debate continued with respect to the political offense
exception, the role of the executive,48 and the rule of non-inquiry
in respect to violations of internationally protected human rights.
9
Once again, the judicial versus executive powers controversy arose
with the United Kingdom in connection with that country's
extradition request for persons charged with violent crimes in
connection with the conflict in Northern Ireland. °  The
contemporary debate over the executive's power in matters of
extradition continues, notwithstanding the existence of legislation
regulating the practice. 1 Understandably, the Executive is
Ch. 378, §§ 1-6, 22 Stat. 215-16 (establishing fees and costs for extradition); Act of June 6,
1900, Ch. 793, 31 Stat. 656 (specifying extraditable offenses and established political
offense exception); Act of June 28, 1902, Ch. 1301 (judicial), 32 Stat. 419, 475 (providing
for collection of costs from requesting state); Act of Mar. 22, 1934, Ch. 73, §§ 1-4, 48 Stat.
454-56 (establishing procedure for extradition to and from countries or territories
controlled by the United States); Act of June 25, 1948, Ch. 645, 62 Stat. 822 (codifying
existing practice not previously set forth in statute); Act of May 24, 1949, Ch. 139, 63 Stat.
96 (amending list of extraditable offenses); and Act of Oct. 17, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-578, §
301(a)(3), 82 Stat. 1107, 1115 (substituting "magistrate" for "commissioner" in extradition
statutes). From 1848 to date, the original Act was amended in a piecemeal fashion eleven
times. For a description of the history of U.S. extradition legislation, see BASSIOUNI,
EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 72-85.
44. 17 F. Cas. 232 (S.D.N.Y. 1847) (No. 9,511); 46 U.S. (5 How.) 176 (1847).
45. 55 U.S. (14 How.) 103 (1852).
46. Supra note 42.
47. For a discussion of this and other misconceptions about extradition, see John G.
Kessler, Some Myths of United States Extradition Law, 76 GEO. L.J. 1441 (1988).
48. See Steven Lubet, Extradition Reform: Executive Discretion and Judicial
Participation in the Extradition of Political Terrorists, 15 CORNELL. INT'L L. J. 247 (1982);
see also sources infra note 60.
49. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 69.
50. See In re Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981); United States v. Doherty, 786 F.2d
491 (2d Cir. 1986). For an extensive discussion of these cases and others relating to the
political offense exception, see BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 594-681. For
a contemporary discussion on the executive's power over foreign affairs, see Saikrishna B.
Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE. L.J.
231 (2001) and Jack L. Goldsmith, Federal Courts, Foreign Affairs, and Federalism, 83 VA.
L. REV. 1617 (1997) (favoring a predominant role for the executive over the judiciary in
matters of foreign affairs).
51. See sources cited supra note 50; see also United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d
103 (1st Cir. 1997) (dealing with the issue of the rule of non-inquiry with respect to
potential re-extradition from Hong Kong to China).
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concerned over delays in the extradition process, 52 the lack of
uniformity in the jurisprudence of the circuits, and the opportunity
for requested persons with financial means, not only to delay the
process, but also to prevail against extradition, all of which impact
on U.S. treaty obligations and foreign relations.
One would assume that the existing overlap between
executive and judicial powers is not that complex to delineate and
distinguish. The executive has the power to enter into treaties and,
if it were not for 18 U.S.C. § 3184, ' 3 the executive could engage in
extradition with executive agreements not subject to the Senate's
"advice and consent," and even on the basis of comity. 4  The
executive also has the power to use discretion in conditioning
extradition or not surrendering a person otherwise found to be
judicially extraditable.55 As to the judiciary, its role is to determine
whether a treaty exists and the identity of the person sought, find
the existence of "probable cause," and apply the conditions of the
treaty and any conditions arising under customary international
law or other relevant applicable treaty. These include substantive
conditions and defenses, exceptions, exemptions, and exclusions,56
and of course any applicable provisions of the Constitution.
Within that context, there are two major legal issues that
remain controversial in terms of the overlapping powers of the
executive and the judiciary. They are the political offense
exception" and the rule of non-inquiry"' with respect to issues
concerning the treatment of the relator once surrendered,
including the penalties that the requesting state may inflict upon
him/her. The jurisprudence of the United States has been
somewhat consistent with respect to the political offense• 59
exception. This jurisprudence presents no issue except that, on
52. Two landmark cases stand out: one in the Second Circuit, Caltagirone v. Grant,
629 F.2d 739 (2d Cir. 1980), and one in the Seventh Circuit, In re Assarsson, 635 F.2d 1237
(7th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 938 (1980), in which this writer represented the
respective relators. The Caltagirone case lasted over four years and extradition was
denied. The Assarsson case lasted almost five years and extradition was granted.
53. 18 U.S.C. § 3184 (2003); see also Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276 (1933);
Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936); United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S.
655 (1992).
54. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 90-92.
55. See id. at 890-98.
56. See id. at 461-750.
57. See id. at 594.
58. See id. at 569.
59. See id. at 594.
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occasion, judicial outcomes are not always satisfactory to the
executive. The rule of non-inquiry, however, presents different
problems in so far as it offers the opportunity to raise at the
judicial hearing a number of issues which the executive would
prefer to deal with on a political level.61  Understandably, the
judiciary is reluctant to give up its prerogatives in this matter
insofar as it is using its powers to order the surrender of a person,
who could also be a U.S. citizen, to a foreign country where his
treatment and punishment could be contrary to both public policy
and the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishment." 62
60. For example, Mackin, 668 F.2d 122, and Doherty, 786 F.2d 491, resulted in the
United States and the United Kingdom entering into a supplemental extradition treaty.
Extradition Supplementary Treaty, June 25, 1985, U.S.-U.K., T.I.A.S. No. 12050; see also
M. Cherif Bassiouni, The "Political Offense Exception" Revisited: Extradition Between the
U.S. and the U.K.-A Choice Between Friendly Cooperation Among Allies and Sound Law
and Policy, 15 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 255 (1987); United States-United Kingdom
Extradition Treaty: Hearing Before the S. Foreign Relations Comm., 99th Cong., 1st Sess.
276 (1985) (statement of M. Cherif Bassiouni, Professor of Law, DePaul University);
Christopher L. Blakesley, The Evisceration of the Political Offense Exception, 15 DENV. J.
INT'L L. & POL'Y 109 (1986).
61. See United States v. Lui Kin-Hong, 110 F.3d 103 (1st Cir. 1997).
62. See Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901) (setting forth the rule of non-inquiry).
But see Gallina v. Fraser, 278 F.2d 77 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 851 (1960) (opening
the door to questioning the rule of non-inquiry). For a discussion of this question, see
BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 572-583. More recently the United States,
having ratified the United Nations Convention Against Torture and other Forms of Cruel,
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, which prohibits extradition whenever
there is a likelihood that the relator will be tortured, addressed the question in specific
legislation which gives that power to the Secretary of State. For the United Nations
Convention, see U.N. REV. 39-46, 39 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 51, at 197 (1984), which
entered into force with respect to the United States on November 20, 1994. The
Convention's Article 3 prohibits extradition if there is a likelihood that the relator is going
to be tortured in the requesting state. Foreign Affairs Reform and Restructuring (Farr)
Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998). The Secretary of State's
prerogative is discretionary. 22 C.F.R. § 95.4 (2001). That discretion is reviewable under
the Administrative Procedure Act (A.P.A.) 5 U.S.C. § 1104 (2001). Thus the extradition
court does not have the right to deal with claims arising under the Torture Convention.
For the application of this legislation, see Cornejo-Barreto v. Seifert, 218 F.3d 1004 (9th
Cir. 2000). See also Castillo v. Forsht, 623 F.2d 1098 (5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S.
922 (1981). This case involved an issue of torture of the relator who fled from Mexico.
Even though there was no question that the fugitive had been tortured in Mexico, the
Fifth Circuit was not swayed by the argument that U.S. courts, as a matter of judicial
integrity, should not extradite persons likely to be tortured. Since then, the United States
adopted legislation consonant with the obligations of this country under the U.N. Torture
Convention of 1984, but the determination of non-extradition is left with the executive,
not with the judiciary.
Reforming International Extradition
It is astonishing that some of the same issues and debates
which occurred in connection with the Robbins case and which
lasted until the passage of the 1848 legislation still linger on. It is
equally astonishing that the 1848 Act has not been
comprehensively overhauled since then, notwithstanding
congressional efforts between 1981 and 1984.63
To a large extent, this stagnation is due to lack of sufficient
congressional interest in the passage of progressive non-partisan
legislation addressing the issue. Such legislation should provide a
balance between the need to surrender to other countries persons
accused or charged with crimes, and the need to observe "due
process of law," and, where appropriate, uphold international
human rights norms as well as constitutional norms and standards.
Regrettably, ideological battle lines have been drawn between
what is commonly referred to as "conservative" and "liberal"
thinking on international human rights and domestic civil rights
issues. Instead, the proper balance should be drawn along the
lines of efficient and expeditious extradition proceedings-
unhampered by undue formalities-but consistent with the
application of the same norms and standards the judiciary must
apply in ordinary criminal cases. By no means should extradition
be converted into a mini-trial, but neither should it become a
rubber-stamp judicial procedure for the requests of foreign
governments that a given administration may support, as in the
case of President John Adams' message to Judge Bee in the 1795
case of In re Robbins discussed infra.
The result of ambiguity in the existing legislation has led to a
divergence in the jurisprudence of the courts66 and the
politicization of extradition.67 The government, sometimes out of
63. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Extradition Reform Legislation in the United States:
1981-83, 17 AKRON L. REV. 495 (1984); BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 70.
64. See cases cited supra note 62.
65. See, e.g., BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6 (providing a critique of some of
the provisions of 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 in connection with various legal issues).
66. One example is the long-standing divergence of views between circuits on the
question of whether a relator has standing to raise the rule of specialty. See BASSIOUNI,
EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 511 et. seq.
67. A case in point is Alvarez-Machain , 504 U.S. 655 (1992), in which the Supreme
Court took the absurd position that because the treaty between the United States and
Mexico does not expressly prohibit kidnapping, such a practice is permissible. The
Supreme Court's ruling became more embarrassing when the Federal District Court in
California ruled that Dr. Alvarez-Machain, who was kidnapped from Mexico, was not the
person believed to have committed the act charged in the indictment. In contrast, the
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understandable frustration, but sometimes also out of a disregard
for the rule of law, engages in conduct that challenges the integrity
of the legal process. Such conduct is sometimes tolerated by
magistrates and federal district court judges who come from the
ranks of federal prosecutors and tend to favor the government's
69position. Since most extradition cases involve drug offenses, the
bending of the rules is all too easily rationalized. After the
September 11 attacks and the climate of fear created in their
aftermath (in large part by the Administration), the tendency to
give "due process" short shrift is all too evident. Yet it is difficult
to understand why it is preferable to engage in questionable
constitutional and ethical practices when institutional reform is a
more just and efficient solution.
What is needed is a new radical approach to the existing law
of extradition practice that can be integrated into comprehensive
legislation on all modalities of international cooperation in penal
matters.
The outlines of such an approach would include:
1. Abandoning the cumbersome process of basing extradition
on treaties. Instead, it should be based on national legislation,
supplemented by executive agreements establishing reciprocity
subject to our national legislation, but not requiring Senate
"advice and consent" for these executive agreements. Moreover,
Supreme Court of Israel, in the highly emotionally-charged case of John Demjanjuk, who
was extradited from the United States on the assumption that he was "Ivan the Terrible,"
a Nazi guard at the infamous Treblinka Camp, acknowledged that Demjanjuk was not in
fact the person charged with "crimes against humanity" at that time and place. But John
Demjanjuk was extradited from the United States with the knowledge that he was not the
person sought, namely "Ivan the Terrible." The Office of Special Investigations of the
Department of Justice acted in this improper and unethical manner, for which the Sixth
Circuit duly chastised it. But none of those responsible were ever disciplined or brought
before the Ethics Committee of the Bar. Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338 (6th Cir.
1993).
68. See United States v. Abello-Silva, 948 F.2d 1168 (10th Cir. 1991); Demjanjuk v.
Petrovsky, 10 F.3d 338, 352 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 914 (1994); Wang v.
Reno, 81 F.3d 808 (9th Cir. 1996); Lindstrom v. Graber, 203 F.3d 470 (7th Cir. 2000). For
a case giving rise to disciplinary action, see Lightfoot, 217 F.3d 914 (7th Cir. 2000) (citing
In re Snyder, 472 U.S. 634 (1985)). See also BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at
885-890.
69. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, Preface and Introduction to the
Fourth Edition, XI-XXI.
70. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 183 (discussing the "Patriot Act,"
Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)).
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extradition based on national legislation could be practiced on the
basis of comity. This eliminates the lengthy process of negotiating
treaties and encumbering the U.S. Senate with treaties to which it
has to give "advice and consent." It would also avoid the problem
of treaty obsolescence and the need to negotiate additional
protocols.7'
2. The judiciary's role should clearly include the power to
address issues such as the principle of specialty without the need
for a foreign government's protest.72 Moreover, in order to clarify
the overlapping powers of the executive and the judiciary, the rule
of non-inquiry should be limited, allowing the judiciary to inquire
into certain fundamental human rights issues such as torture and
re-extradition by the requesting state to another state.
3. Review of extradition should be by appeal74 and not
through the process of habeas corpus.75 This would streamline
cases that go before a federal district court on a habeas petition,
and, if denied, by a review before the circuit court of appeals.
Giving the government an opportunity to review on appeal would
also bring finality to the case.
4. National legislation should eliminate the sui generis nature
of extradition and consider it a criminal proceeding to which the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Federal Rules of
Evidences apply, with the exception of limitations on hearsay
evidence, since evidence presented by requesting states cannot be
tested on this basis. It should also be made clear that the
extradition hearing is in the nature of a "probable cause" hearing,
and not a mini-trial on the guilt or innocence of the requested
person.
5. Lastly, improper conduct by government attorne ,s and
private counsel should be subject to disciplinary action. The
proposed national legislation should be comprehensive and
detailed. Further, the legislation should take into account the
conflicting decisions involving the applicability of the
71. The United States has 137 treaties and protocols with 103 countries. See
BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION supra note 6, at 925.
72. See id. at 546.
73. See supra note 67.
74. This issue was raised by the government in Mackin, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
75. See BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 857.
76. See sources supra note 68.
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constitutional norms on "probable cause" and bail;77 clarify the
standards and duration for preliminary arrests before the filing of
a formal extradition request; set forth with specificity the contents
of an extradition complaint; establish the limited right of
discovery; and fix the length of proceedings.
Extradition should become a reasonably expeditious process,
which respects the integrity of our legal processes and upholds
international human rights standards and U.S. Constitutional
standards.
Extradition problems originate not only from the United
States, but also, and maybe mostly, they come to the United States
from foreign countries. Some of these problems involve the non-
extradition of nationals, which some constitutions forbid." Others
have to do with the complex criminal laws that the United States
has enacted, which few foreign countries have. 9 This poses a
problem with respect to satisfying the requirement of "double
criminality. ,,so
Of greater significance are two sets of problems that are not
of a legal nature. In some developing countries, there are few
experts in their ministries of foreign affairs and justice or among
the ranks of public prosecutors and judges to deal effectively with
international extradition requests. In part because of the lack of
sufficient expertise and in part because of a selective approach to
engage in extradition only through bilateral treaties, the United
States has relatively few treaties with developing countries.81 Thus,
the absence of a treaty makes such a country a safe-haven for U.S.
fugitives. When coupled with the non-extradition of nationals in
some countries, the number of safe-havens increases.
If we combine the problems of extradition stemming from
and presented to the United States, we realize that this modality of
77. For a discussion on bail, see BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 794. In
Parretti, the Ninth Circuit was the first circuit to uphold the applicability of the
constitutional right to bail, as well as the applicability of the constitutional standards of
"probable cause." Parretti v. United States, 122 F.3d 758 (9th Cir. 1997), withdrawn on
other grounds, 143 F.3d 508 (9th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 877 (1998).
78. Among such constitutions are those of Israel, Germany, Italy, and Columbia. See
BASSIOUNI, EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 682.
79. See id. at 504.
80. Id.
81. For a list of these treaties, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3181-3196 (2003) and BASSIOUNI,
EXTRADITION, supra note 6, at 925 (Appendix II - Bilateral Treaties of the United
States).
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international cooperation in penal matters is not as effective as it
should be. Despite this ineffectiveness, there is no legislative
policy aimed at finding remedies to the weaknesses of the
extradition process-a process that is crucial to the prevention and
suppression of criminality, whether it be national, transnational, or
international.
In part, these problems derive from a lack of legislative
imagination, which would require casting away the 1848 legislative
scheme that still governs us (albeit with some modification) and
developing a radically new approach. This approach is based on
the assumption that extradition is only one of the modalities of
international cooperation in penal matters. The others are mutual
legal assistance, transfer of criminal proceedings, transfer of
sentenced persons, recognition of foreign penal judgments,
freezing and seizing of assets, intelligence and law enforcement
cooperation and exchange of information, and regional judicial
82spaces.
Extradition must therefore be integrated into a single
comprehensive code of international cooperation in penal matters
that includes all of these modalities, which are dealt with discretely
in many treaties as well as addressed in several parts of U.S.
legislation. 3  The following modalities are addressed in a
compartmentalized fashion: extradition (treaties and legislation),
mutual legal assistance (treaties and no legislation except for
"Letters Rogatory"), transfer of sentenced persons (treaties and
national legislation), freezing and seizing of assets (treaties and no
international legislation, only domestic).
The reform of extradition discussed above must be integrated
in a comprehensive code of international cooperation because,
while it is the best way of enhancing the effectiveness of all these
modalities, it will be particularly beneficial to extradition. For
example, under the present approach, if a country does not
82. For a discussion of these modalities by various experts, see 2 INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999).
83. For example, mutual legal assistance is reflected in a number of U.S. treaties with
foreign countries. See Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Treaties (MLATs)
and Other Agreements, at http://travel.state.gov/mlat.html (last visited Sept. 21, 2003). But
there is no legislation that regulates the practice. In contrast, 28 U.S.C. § 1781 (2003)
regulates "Letters Regulatory." That title applies to federal civil procedure, but "Letters
Rogatory" have been extended to criminal matters. Transfer of sentenced persons is
covered by a few treaties and by Title 18 U.S.C. § 4100 (2003).
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extradite its nationals, no alternatives exist. Instead, the
integrated approach proposed would offer several options. One
would be conditional extradition for only the trial, subject to the
return of the relator, if found quietly, to the originally requested
state where the convicted person's sentence would be carried out.
This of course presupposes the acceptance of the originally
requested execution of sentence. Another option is that of
transfer of the criminal proceedings from the requesting state to
the requested state that does not want to extradite. The originally
requested state would then carry out the obligation of aut dedere
aut judicare.84
This "gear-shifting" technique permits the use of other
modalities of international cooperation to achieve the ultimate
goal of prosecution even when extradition fails. Suffice it to recall
more than ten years of stalemate between the United
States/United Kingdom and Libya with respect to the extradition
of two persons indicted in Scotland and in the United States for
the Pan-Am 103 explosion, known as the "Lockerbie Case."'85
Shortly after the tragic incident of Pan Am 103's explosion
over Lockerbie, Scotland on December 21, 1988,86 the United
States and Scotland issued indictments against two Libyan
intelligence operatives, Abdelbasset Ali Al-Megrahi and Lamine
Khalifa Fhimah. They were charged with planting explosives on
the plane, which resulted in the death of 259 passengers and eleven
persons in and around the town of Lockerbie, Scotland. Thus, the
United Kingdom and the United States sought the extradition
from Libya of these two Libyan nationals charged with crimes
arising out of that explosion. The Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation provides for
the duty to prosecute in Article 7, and for the duty to extradite in
84. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI AND EDWARD M. WISE, AUT DEDERE AUT
JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995).
85. The case was first brought before the International Court of Justice (ICJ). See
generally Questions of Interpretation and Application of. 1971 Montreal Convention
arising from the Aerial Incident at Lockerbie, General List No. 88 (Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya v. U.K.) (instituted in ICJ registry Mar. 3, 1992), at http://www.icj-
cij.org/icjwww/idocket/iluk/iluk2frame.htm (last visited Sept. 21, 2003) (providing
application, pleadings, orders, oral arguments, and judgments arising out of this incident).
86. Scotland has autonomy within the United Kingdom, and has its own distinct legal
system in which the death penalty has been abolished. Nevertheless, the government of
the United Kingdom acts on behalf of Scotland in matters of foreign affairs, as does the
U.S. government with respect to the states within its federal system.
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Article 8.87 Libya argued that it had the priority right to prosecute.
The United States and the United Kingdom argued that no
prosecution in Libya would be effective because Libyan
authorities were involved in the plot; instead, they claimed a
priority right for their extradition request over Libya's claim of the
right to prosecute. Libya responded by arguing that these two
governments would not provide its nationals with a fair trial.
Consequently, the unarticulated premises of effectiveness and
fairness in the execution of the alternative duties to prosecute or
extradite became the legal basis for a political stalemate.
In 1992, Libya filed suit against the United States and the
United Kingdom in the ICJ.m To forestall the ICJ's decision on
the merits of the case filed by Libya, the United States and United
Kingdom obtained from the Security Council Resolution 731
requiring Libya to surrender the two accused to the United States
and to the United Kingdom.89 Because the U.N. Charter does not
give the ICJ the express power of judicial review over Security
Council decisions, the ICJ felt estopped from passing judgment on
whether such a resolution was a valid exercise of the Council's
prerogatives under Chapter VII, which deals with issues involving
peace and security. Thus, a finding by the Council-that the non-
extradition of two accused bombers constituted a threat to world
peace and security-was not judicially reviewable by the ICJ.9
But the ICJ was nonetheless faced with the merits of the case filed
by Libya pursuant to the 1971 Montreal Convention,9' namely,
whether the duty to prosecute had precedence over the duty to
extradite, and by implication, if there were any unarticulated
conditions relating to effectiveness and fairness.
The stalemate lasted for ten years but was never resolved by
the ICJ. Instead, the interested states brought the stalemate to an
end. Libya, the United States, and the United Kingdom agreed to
87. Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation (Montreal Hijacking Convention), Sept. 23, 1971, 24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S.
177, 10 LL.M. 1151; reprinted in M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM:
MULTILATERAL CONVENTIONS (1937-2001), 135 (2001).
88. See supra note 85.
89. S.C. Res. 731, U.N. Doc. S/Res/731 (1992), reprinted in 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI,
INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM: A COMPILATION OF U.N. DOCUMENTS (1972-2001), 20
(2002).
90. See, e.g., INTERNATIONAL LAW: ACHIEVEMENTS AND PROSPECTS (Mohammed
Bedjaoui ed., 1992).
91. Supra note 87.
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have what was equivalent to a change of venue-Scottish judges
sitting in an unused Dutch military facility outside The Hague,
applying Scottish criminal law and procedure. There, after a two-
year trial, one defendant, Abdelbasset Ali Al-Megrahi, was found
guilty and sentenced to life imprisonment. The other defendant,
Lamine Khalifa Fhimah, was found "not guilty by reason of
insufficient evidence" (which is a form of verdict available under
Scottish law when the evidence does not rise to the standard of
"beyond reasonable doubt"). 9
In the era of globalization, with increased forms and
manifestations of international crimes causing major harmful93
consequences, and transnational crimes like drug trafficking and
terrorism, 94 international cooperation in penal matters is
indispensable, and extradition the most important of all its
modalities. These goals can only be accomplished through non-
partisan, comprehensive, and detailed legislation, which fairly
balances the sometimes-competing interests of efficient justice and
its fair execution.
92. While the legal stalemate over prosecuting the two Lockerbie accused has been
brought to an end by means of a practical arrangement that satisfied the concerns of the
interested governments, the arrangement did not provide an answer to the basic question
of whether prosecution has priority over extradition, nor to the corollary questions
pertaining to requirements of effectiveness and fairness. The ICJ had the opportunity to
clarify these issues, but failed to do so. Thus, the questions concerning the duties to
prosecute or extradite and the premises of effectiveness and fairness remain substantially
unanswered, except for what is expressed in the writings of scholars.
93. See M. Cherif Bassiouni, Accountability for Violations of International
Humanitarian Law and Other Serious Violations of Human Rights, in POST-CONFLICr
JUSTICE 3 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002).
94. CHRISTOPHER L. BLAKESLEY, TERRORISM, DRUGS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1992).
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